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Abstract
Theorists have proposed that heightened anxiety vulnerability is characterised by reduced
attentional control performance and have made the prediction in turn that elevating cognitive
load will adversely impact attentional control performance for high anxious individuals to a
greater degree than low anxious individuals. Critically however, existing attempts to test this
prediction have been limited in their methodology and have presented inconsistent findings.
Using a methodology capable of overcoming the limitations of previous research, the pres-
ent study sought to investigate the effect of manipulating cognitive load on inhibitory atten-
tional control performance of high anxious and low anxious individuals. High and low trait
anxious participants completed an antisaccade task, requiring the execution of prosaccades
towards, or antisaccades away from, emotionally toned stimuli while eye movements were
recorded. Participants completed the antisaccade task under conditions that concurrently
imposed a lesser cognitive load, or greater cognitive load. Analysis of participants’ saccade
latencies revealed high trait anxious participants demonstrated generally poorer inhibitory
attentional control performance as compared to low trait anxious participants. Furthermore,
conditions imposing greater cognitive load, as compared to lesser cognitive load, resulted in
enhanced inhibitory attentional control performance across participants generally. Crucially
however, analyses did not reveal an effect of cognitive load condition on anxiety-linked dif-
ferences in inhibitory attentional control performance, indicating that elevating cognitive load
did not adversely impact attentional control performance for high anxious individuals to a
greater degree than low anxious individuals. Hence, the present findings are inconsistent
with predictions made by some theorists and are in contrast to the findings of earlier investi-
gations. These findings further highlight the need for research into the relationship between
anxiety, attentional control, and cognitive load.
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Introduction
An essential function of effective attentional processing is the capacity to control the allocation
of attention in the presence of task-irrelevant information. This function, known as attentional
control, involves several components of cognitive processing including the attentional inhibi-
tion of distractor stimuli, volitional control of the allocation of attention towards target stimuli,
and working memory necessary for the active maintenance of attentional processing priorities
[1]. Importantly, individuals differ in the degree to which they are effective at implementing
attentional control. One factor that has been demonstrated to affect attentional control perfor-
mance is individual differences in the tendency to experiencing anxiety (anxiety vulnerability).
Researchers have revealed that, in general, heightened anxiety vulnerability is associated
with poorer attentional control, and specifically a reduction in the capacity to control the
attentional inhibition of task-irrelevant stimuli (see [2] for a review). Evidence of this effect
has commonly been observed using an antisaccade task paradigm [3]. The antisaccade task
paradigm requires participants to execute eye movements (saccades) either towards or away
from an abruptly presented stimulus. The movement to attend towards the stimulus (i.e. a pro-
saccade) is largely a reflexive response and provides an assessment of stimulus driven atten-
tional capture. By contrast, the correct execution a saccade away from the stimulus (i.e. an
antisaccade) requires control over the inhibition of the reflexive prosaccade and the execution
of a volitional saccade away from the stimulus. The difference in the latency to execute antisac-
cades relative to prosaccades, the ‘antisaccade cost’, has commonly been taken to reflect the
ability of individuals to exert inhibitory attentional control, with larger costs indicating poorer
capacity to exert control [4–6].
To examine anxiety-linked differences in inhibitory attentional control, Derakshan and col-
leagues [7] had individuals who varied in anxiety vulnerability complete an antisaccade task.
The investigators found that individuals high in anxiety vulnerability as compared to those low
in anxiety vulnerability demonstrated a significantly greater antisaccade cost, indicative of an
anxiety-linked reduction in the capacity to control attentional inhibition. Subsequent studies
have demonstrated evidence of anxiety-linked impairments in inhibitory attentional control
across variants of the antisaccade task paradigm [8,9], and within other attentional tasks. For
example, Moser et al. examined the association between level of anxiety vulnerability and the
degree to which task-irrelevant distractor stimuli captured attention during a visual search
task [10]. It was found that heightened anxiety vulnerability was associated with elevated atten-
tional distraction by the distractor stimuli. Similarly, Edwards et al. showed that heightened
anxiety vulnerability was associated with reduced inhibitory control during a No-Go para-
digm, which requires participants to execute volitional responses on target-absent trials and
inhibit responding on relatively rare and randomly presented target-present trials [11]. Given
these and other findings demonstrating association between elevated anxiety vulnerability and
reduced inhibitory attentional control performance (e.g. [9,12,13]) scholars have theorised
that heightened anxiety vulnerability impairs inhibitory attentional control performance
[2,14,15].
While researchers have demonstrated that increasing load on perceptual processing can
increase performance on primary cognitive tasks under certain conditions [16,17], it is also
well documented that performance on a primary cognitive task can be adversely impacted as
demands on cognitive processes, often manipulated with a concurrent secondary task, are
increased [18]. For example, investigators have observed that antisaccade performance
decreases when individuals are required to perform a secondary task that imposes high
demands on working memory, as compared to low demands on working memory, reflecting
an adverse impact of elevated cognitive load upon inhibitory attentional control [19–21]. Such
Anxiety, attentional control, and cognitive load
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205720 October 16, 2018 2 / 16
collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
findings have led theorists to propose that individual differences in inhibitory attentional con-
trol performance result from the degree to which cognitive capacity is able to be recruited [22].
Accordingly, theorists interested in the relationship between anxiety vulnerability and atten-
tional control performance have hypothesised that anxiety-linked reduction in attentional
control performance may arise due to anxiety-linked reductions in available cognitive capacity
[2,23]. This has given rise to the specific prediction that the adverse impact of a concurrent
cognitive load upon inhibitory attentional control performance should be greater for individu-
als with heightened anxiety vulnerability, as compared to individuals with low anxiety vulnera-
bility [23].
Researchers have sought to test the validity of this prediction by examining the impact of
increasing cognitive load on anxiety-linked impairment in inhibitory attentional control.
These investigations have resulted in mixed findings. Berggren et al. required participants to
complete an antisaccade task while engaging in a secondary task requiring the detection of
auditory tones (low cognitive load), or identification of the tone’s pitch (high cognitive load)
[24]. In this case, increased cognitive load resulted in reduced task performance across all par-
ticipants. Importantly however, when considering participants’ anxiety, it was revealed that
greater levels of anxiety vulnerability were associated with greater declines in attentional con-
trol performance during the high cognitive load condition, relative to the low load condition.
This finding is consistent with the prediction that elevation in cognitive load would dispropor-
tionately deteriorate inhibitory attentional control performance amongst high anxious indi-
viduals, as compared to low anxious individuals. Critically however performance on the
secondary task was not measured. Thus, it is unclear whether these findings were the result of
the predicted effect, or the result of differences in the degree to which individual with higher
or lower levels of anxiety vulnerability engaged with the secondary task.
Another investigation of this prediction was conducted by Berggren et al. [25]. Here, partic-
ipants were required to engage in a visual search task in which participants were instructed to
determine whether one face, in a display of eight faces, displayed a unique emotional expres-
sion. A within-participants manipulation of cognitive load either required participants to con-
currently engage in a counting task that required counting backwards from a given number in
intervals of three (high cognitive load) or did not require engagement with a concurrent task
(low cognitive load). Results revealed that high anxious individuals demonstrated reduced
visual search performance, reflected by longer search latencies, under conditions of high cog-
nitive load as compared to low cognitive load, whilst low anxious individuals did not show this
effect. This finding too is consistent with the prediction that elevated cognitive load will impact
inhibitory attentional control performance disproportionately for individuals high in anxiety
vulnerability as compared to low in anxiety vulnerability. That is, if indeed high anxious partic-
ipants, as compared to low anxious participants, were impaired at inhibiting the processing of
faces in the set, this would foreseeably lead to relatively longer search latencies. Importantly
however, numerous attentional processes are believed to be involved in the efficiency and
speed of visual search during visual search paradigms, including attentional capture and atten-
tional engagement [26], attentional disengagement [27], and attentional inhibition [28]. Thus,
the results reported by Berggren et al. [25] could also be consistent with alternative explana-
tions. For example, it is possible that anxiety-linked differences observed in visual search laten-
cies were the result of differences in the speed at which participants disengaged attention from
faces in the set once they had attended to them, rather than differences in inhibiting attentional
capture by faces in the set. Once again, while this finding is consistent with the proposal that
elevated cognitive load disproportionately impacts inhibitory attentional control amongst high
anxious individuals, the possibility that observed visual search performance was the result of
cognitive load impacting other attentional processes cannot be ruled out.
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Nonetheless, the findings by Berggren et al. [24,25] are in contrast with other studies, which
have not observed an adverse effect of heightened cognitive load on inhibitory attentional con-
trol performance amongst high state-anxious individuals. Najmi et al. [29] examined perfor-
mance on the Attention Network Task [30], a task designed to assess specific facets of
attentional processing, including inhibitory attentional control. Cognitive load was manipu-
lated by modifying the difficulty of a reverse counting task designed to engage working mem-
ory resources. Importantly, investigators observed no significant difference in inhibitory
attentional control performance between conditions of low and high cognitive load for low
state-anxious individuals, while observing that high state-anxious individuals demonstrated
increased inhibitory attention control performance under high cognitive load, as compared to
low cognitive load. It is important to note however that this study examined individuals who
rated high or low in state anxiety, not anxiety vulnerability (although such measures are
known to be highly correlated). As such, these findings do not conclusively inform upon the
relationship between cognitive load and inhibitory attentional control performance amongst
individuals who are high in anxiety vulnerability. Furthermore, the study did not measure par-
ticipants’ adherence to the reverse counting task, meaning that individual differences in inhibi-
tory attentional control performance under each cognitive load condition could potentially be
the result of differences in adherence to the cognitive load task under each condition.
It is also noteworthy that there is evidence that the emotional tone of attentional stimuli
can modulate the magnitude of anxiety-linked impairment in inhibitory attentional control
[7,12,31–33], and so it is plausible that conditions that load cognitive resources may further
exacerbate the impact of emotional stimuli on attentional control performance. Indeed, some
researchers have theorised that as attentional control become more greatly impaired emotion-
ally negative stimuli will capture attention to a greater degree [34], while other have proposed
that, when cognitive processes are taxed emotional stimuli will become less salient to the atten-
tional system [35,36]. Given these alternate predictions, investigation of the impact of emo-
tionally negative stimuli on anxiety-linked differences in attentional control performance in
the face of high and low cognitive load would usefully inform theories that describe the man-
ner in which elevated anxiety impacts controlled attentional processing of emotional informa-
tion [2,34].
Investigation of the effect of cognitive load on the relationship between anxiety vulnerabil-
ity and attentional control performance is critical to understanding the mechanisms underly-
ing anxiety-linked impairments in attentional control performance, as well as to further
informing theories that seek to describe the relationship between attentional control and anxi-
ety vulnerability (e.g. [15,23]). Thus, given the methodological issues present in previous stud-
ies and the inconsistency in the resulting findings it is important that research continues to
investigate the relationship between inhibitory attentional control, cognitive load, and anxiety
vulnerability.
Hence, the aim of the present study was to contribute to the investigation of this relation-
ship by employing a methodology that could overcome the limitations of previous research.
To do so, the present study subjected individuals with high levels and low levels of anxiety vul-
nerability to a dual task paradigm that could assess inhibitory attentional control whilst con-
currently manipulating cognitive load. To overcome the limitations of previous research it was
necessary for this methodology to implement a task capable of assessing inhibitory attentional
control specifically. Hence, inhibitory attentional control was assessed using an antisaccade
task, which requires participants to execute eye movements either towards or away from an
abruptly presented stimulus. As described earlier, this task has been commonly used to assess
inhibitory attentional control and the impact of anxiety vulnerability on this attentional pro-
cess [7–9,37].
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To assess the impact of cognitive load on attentional control, participants’ performance on
the antisaccade task was assessed under conditions of high cognitive load and low cognitive
load. Once more, to overcome the limitations of previous research it was essential that partici-
pant performance to this secondary task could be examined. Thus, the methodology manipu-
lated cognitive load by requiring participants to retain a set of digits in memory for later recall.
Cognitive load was manipulated by increasing or decreasing the number of unique digits to be
retained in memory in each set and performance was examined by assessing the rate of accu-
rate recall.
Lastly, given evidence that anxiety-linked reduction in inhibitory attentional control may
be modulated by the emotional tone of attentional stimuli [7,31–33], and given that theorists
have sought to describe the manner in which elevated anxiety vulnerability impacts controlled
attentional processing of emotional information [2,34,38], it was deemed useful to permit
examination of the effect of cognitive load on anxiety-linked differences in attentional control
performance in the face of emotional and unemotional stimuli. Hence, the emotional tone of
stimuli presented in the antisaccade task was varied within participants to present either emo-
tionally negative, emotionally positive, or unemotional attentional stimuli.
Considering previous research that has demonstrated anxiety-linked impairment in inhibi-
tory attentional control, it was predicted that high anxious individuals, when compared to low
anxious individuals, would exhibit reduced inhibitory attentional control performance, as
indexed by reduced performance on the antisaccade task. Because engagement with a concur-
rent working memory task will occupy cognitive resources amongst all participants, it was also
predicted that conditions imposing a heightened cognitive load, as compared to a lesser cogni-
tive load, would result in reduced inhibitory attentional control performance across individu-
als irrespective of level of anxiety vulnerability. Crucially however, the purpose of the present
study was to determine the validity of the prediction that the adverse impact of increasing cog-
nitive load upon attentional control performance would be greater for individuals with height-
ened anxiety vulnerability, as compared to individuals with low anxiety vulnerability. Hence,
the primary concern of the study was to determine whether high anxious individuals, when
compared to low anxious individuals, demonstrate disproportionately reduced attentional
control performance under conditions that impose a high cognitive load, relative to those
imposing low cognitive load.
Method
Participants
In order to selectively recruit individuals with relatively high and low levels of anxiety vulnera-
bility, an initial screening procedure was conducted on 644 undergraduate students using the
Trait scale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; [39]). This procedure was conducted
as part of a larger research screening battery completed by undergraduate psychology students
at the University of Western Australia. The STAI-T is a widely used assessment for the mea-
surement of anxiety vulnerability. Individuals with STAI-T scores in the upper and lower
tercile, corresponding to scores above 43 and below 36 respectively, were then invited to par-
ticipate in the present study in exchange for course credit or AUD$10. Twenty-five high trait
anxious (18 female) and 24 low trait anxious (14 female) participants were recruited to com-
plete the study. All participants had normal vision or corrected-to-normal vision.
Experimental hardware
The antisaccade task was developed using Experiment Builder 1.10.165 (SR Research Ltd, Mis-
sissauga, Canada) and was presented on a widescreen 24” monitor at a resolution of 1920 x
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1080 pixels. Participants’ eye movements were recorded using a desk-mounted SR Research
EyeLink 1000. This eye tracker recorded monocular gaze at 1000Hz, with up to .25˚ accuracy
and .01˚ spatial resolution. Eye movements were recorded using pupil centre corneal reflection
with nine calibration points.
Experimental stimuli
Antisaccade task stimuli. Antisaccade task stimuli consist of 16 actors, eight male and
eight female, each expressing happy and angry emotions, as well as a neutral pose. Face images
were taken from the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions [40]. Images in the set have demon-
strated a high level of reliability and validity in the recognition of these facial expressions by
observers [40]. Face images were presented in greyscale and were 5.47cm x 7.03cm in size, sub-
tending at approximately 5.80˚ x 7.46˚ visual angle, at a viewing distance of 54cm. In order to
control for the potential extraneous influence of low-level image properties on saccadic behav-
iour, face images were matched on mean luminance and contrast using the SHINE toolbox for
MATLAB [41].
Cognitive load stimuli. Cognitive load stimuli for the antisaccade task were employed to
impose either high or low cognitive load. These stimuli consisted of sets of 6 randomly gener-
ated digits presented in a row. Each digit in the set was presented in white text, and ranged
from 0 to 9. The row of digits spanned 4.81cm x .92cm in size, which subtended a visual angle
of approximately 5.10˚ by .98˚ respectively. Under conditions of high cognitive load, each digit
set consisted of six unique digits (e.g. 859024). Under conditions of low cognitive load, the
digit set consisted of a single digit repeated six times (e.g. 333333). This method of presentation
manipulated cognitive load while keeping perceptual load constant across conditions.
Antisaccade task
The purpose of the antisaccade task was to yield a measure of participants’ inhibitory atten-
tional control performance under conditions that imposed a concurrent lower or heightened
cognitive load. The task required participants to execute saccades towards (prosaccades), or
saccades away from (antisaccades), a face stimulus.
For each trial, a central fixation cross was initially presented for 500ms. The fixation cross
was white and subtended at approximately 1˚ VA. This was replaced by a high load or low load
cognitive load stimulus for 2000ms, followed by a mask (“######”) for 200ms. A second fixa-
tion cross was then presented for 1500ms, followed by the presentation of a face stimulus. A
gaze contingency algorithm was implemented such that the face stimulus would only appear if
a fixation was detected at the location of the cross, otherwise the cross remained on the screen
until an appropriate fixation was detected. The face stimulus was displayed for 600ms at 11˚
VA eccentricity to the left or right of the screen centre with equal frequency. The stimulus dis-
played a happy, neutral, or angry face with equal frequency. During presentation of the face
stimulus, participants were required to perform either a prosaccade or antisaccade in response
to the stimulus. Following this, a probe was presented at the screen centre. The probe consisted
of a single digit that was either present or not present in the preceding cognitive load stimulus
with equal frequency. Participants were required to determine whether the probe was present.
On trials where the probe was present in the cognitive load stimulus, the probe was present at
any of the six positions within the cognitive load stimulus with equal probability. The probe
was displayed until participants made their response with a corresponding button press. Sub-
sequently the next trial was initiated following a 500ms inter-trial interval.
Eight blocks of trials were presented in a random order. The trial blocks orthogonally con-
trasted the saccade response and cognitive load required during trials. This resulted in two
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blocks requiring prosaccades under low cognitive load, two blocks requiring prosaccades
under high cognitive load, two blocks requiring antisaccades under low cognitive load, and
two blocks requiring antisaccade under high cognitive load. Each block contained 24 random-
ized trials. At the start of each block, the instruction “TOWARDS” or “AWAY” was presented
to indicate the saccade response required to be executed in retaliation to the stimuli for each
trial within the block.
On each trial the latency for participants to execute the required saccade was recorded. The
latency to execute a saccade was defined as the interval between target onset and the initiation
of the required saccade on each trial. Erroneous saccades and errors in probe responses were
also recorded.
Procedure
All procedures conducted were approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the
University of Western Australia. Prior to recruitment, participants were provided an informa-
tion sheet that informed them of the requirements involved in participation and briefed that
the study sought to examine the manner in which the visual information processing system
responds to images of faces under a variety of conditions. Participants were not made aware
of the method or motive of participant recruitment and selection or the role of trait anxiety in
the experimental design. Upon recruitment, participants provided written consent and basic
demographic information. Next, participants were seated in front of the eye tracker with their
head secured in a chin rest, at an approximate viewing distance of 54cm, and an eye-move-
ment calibration procedure was conducted. The testing session was conducted in a sound
attenuated room, with the experimenter monitoring participants’ eye movements from a sec-
ond computer. Participants were verbally instructed of the requirements of the antisaccade
task. Once participant understanding of the task was confirmed by the experimenter partici-
pants completed 16 practice trials. During these practice trials, the execution of each saccade
and probe response was followed by the word “CORRECT” or “INCORRECT” for 1000ms in
green or red colour respectively. This provided feedback to further ensure comprehension of
the task requirements. After completing the practice trials, participants then completed the
antisaccade task with no feedback provided. Re-calibration of eye-movement measures was
performed throughout the task as needed. Once the experimental session had concluded the
experimenter verbally debriefed participants as to the specific aim of the experiment and par-
ticipants were provided this information in writing.
Data preparation
Four participants failed to register a recordable gaze signal during the initial calibration proce-
dure. An additional two participants did not comply with task instructions, each demonstrat-
ing a near 100% erroneous saccade rate across blocks in the antisaccade task. Analyses were
conducted on the remaining 43 participants (23 high anxious, 16 female; 20 low anxious, 13
female). Analyses confirmed that remaining high anxious and low anxious participant groups
did not significantly differ in age (M = 18.81, SD = 2.85 years), t(41) = 1.73, p = .092, or gender
ratio, χ2(1, N = 43) = .10, p = .50, and continued to differ in level of trait anxiety (Low Anxiety
Group, M = 33.75, SD = 6.03; High Anxiety Group, M = 46.57, SD = 8.19), t(41) = 5.77, p<
.001, as intended.
Raw gaze samples were initially cleaned using a two-sample noise reduction filter [42]. Sac-
cades were then defined as samples exceeding a 30˚s-1 velocity threshold and 8000˚s-2 accelera-
tion threshold. To remove artefactual gaze data, such as anticipatory saccades, analysis of
saccade measures included only those trials where the first saccade following target onset was
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greater than 3˚ in amplitude, had occurred between 83ms and 600ms following target onset,
and was directed within 45˚ from horizontal. In addition, to ensure that saccade data reflected
instances where participants had engaged in processing of the cognitive load stimulus, only tri-
als with correct responses to the probe were included in analyses of saccade measures.
Of primary interest to the analysis was the measure of inhibitory attentional control. To
derive such a measure, antisaccade cost scores was computed in keeping with a procedure
adopted by other researchers who examined individual differences in antisaccade performance
[6,31,43,44]. These antisaccade cost scores represented the difference, in milliseconds, between
the mean antisaccade latency and the mean prosaccade latency within each task condition.
Hence, a higher antisaccade cost score reflected relatively greater eye movement latencies asso-
ciated with performing antisaccades as compared to prosaccades, and therefore reflects rela-
tively poorer inhibitory attentional control performance.
Results
It was important to ensure that any anxiety-linked differences in performance on the antisac-
cade task was not confounded by anxiety-linked differences in performance in the concurrent
cognitive load task. Hence, analyses of the collated data first examined whether anxiety groups
differed in their accuracy to discriminate the presence or absence of probes in the digit sets. Of
primary importance to the present predictions, analyses next examined anxiety-linked differ-
ences in performance on the antisaccade task, as indexed by computed antisaccade costs
scores, under each cognitive load condition and under conditions where face stimuli varied in
emotional tone. Lastly, while saccade latencies represent the key measure of performance
reflecting inhibitory attentional control during the antisaccade task, some investigators have
reported anxiety-linked differences in the number of erroneous saccades performed during
antisaccade tasks [12,33], and thus, analyses also examined the potential influence of emotional
tone, cognitive load, and anxiety vulnerability on the number of erroneous saccades performed
by participants during the antisaccade task. Analyses were conducted in R, using the ez, lme4,
and car packages.
Memory probe error rates
Across all conditions the average memory probe error rate was 7.80% (SD = 9.14). The pattern
of memory probe error rates is presented in Fig 1. As the error rate represent a binomial vari-
able an analysis of variance was deemed inappropriate to examine differences between experi-
mental conditions. Instead, a mixed-effects logistic regression model was computed. This
model included participant memory probe error rates as the outcome variable, and Anxiety
Group (high trait anxiety vs low trait anxiety), Saccade Type (prosaccade vs antisaccade), Cog-
nitive Load (low load vs high load), and Stimulus Valence (positive vs neutral vs negative) as
fixed-effect factors. Participants were included as a random-effect variable. The resulting
model was examined via an analysis of deviance that utilised Wald tests to examine the effect
of the fixed-effects factors on memory probe error rates. This analysis revealed a main effect of
Cognitive Load, χ2(1, N = 43) = 135.02, p< .001. This effect was reflected in the observation
that participants made a greater number of errors when the set to be remembered contained
six unique digits in the high load condition (M = 11.41%, SD = 7.75), as compared to one
unique digit in the low load condition (M = 4.20%, SD = 3.02). A main effect of Anxiety Group
was not observed from the analysis, χ2(1, N = 43) = 0.73, p = .39. No other significant main
effects or interaction effects were observed from this analysis. Therefore, the results of this
analysis demonstrated that, as expected, digit sets in presented in the high cognitive load con-
dition were more difficult to recall than digit sets in the low cognitive load condition, and
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furthermore, anxiety groups did not differ in their accuracy to determine whether probes were
present in digit sets.
Though not related to the hypotheses at hand, it was considered that some readers may be
interested in the influence of gender on memory probe error rates. As such, a post-hoc analysis
that also incorporated participant gender (male, female) as a fixed-factor was conducted. This
analysis resulted in a significant main-effect involving gender, p = .024, and an interaction
effect involving anxiety group, cognitive load, and gender, p = .043. However, we advise appro-
priate caution in the interpretation of these effects due to the fact that condition sample sizes
were reduced considerably in these analyses. We guide readers to the publicly available dataset
if they wish to pursue this line of investigation further.
Antisaccade cost scores
Analyses next examined anxiety-linked differences in performance on the antisaccade task.
Descriptive statistics of participants’ saccade latencies for each task condition and anxiety
group are provided in Table 1.
To examine the influence of anxiety vulnerability and cognitive load on antisaccade perfor-
mance a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on participants’ antisaccade costs scores, com-
puted under each cognitive load condition and under conditions where face stimuli varied in
emotional tone. This analysis included Anxiety Group (high trait anxiety vs low trait anxiety)
as the between-groups factor, and Cognitive Load (low vs high) and Stimulus Valence (positive
vs neutral vs negative) as between-groups factors. From the results of this analysis a main
effect of Anxiety Group was evident, F(1,41) = 6.39, p = .015, η2 = .13. This effect indicated
that, consistent with our predictions, high anxious individuals exhibited a greater antisaccade
cost (M = 104.52, SD = 49.93) as compared to low trait anxious individuals (M = 76.30,
SD = 53.54). The analysis also yielded a main effect of Cognitive Load, F(1,41) = 7.29, p = .010,
η2 = .15. This effect revealed that, in contrast to our predictions, high cognitive load resulted
in a smaller antisaccade cost (M = 87.38, SD = 41.82) as compared to low cognitive load
(M = 95.41, SD = 38.12) for participants generally. Most importantly however, the analysis did
Fig 1. Memory probe error rates, as a proportion of total trials, for task conditions and anxiety groups. Height of
bars represent mean error rates, error bars represent 95% confidence interval, points represent mean error rates of
individual participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205720.g001
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not yield a significant interaction effect involving Anxiety Group and Cognitive Load, F(1,41)
= 0.40, p = .53, η2 = .01. No other effects reached statistical significance. Crucially, this revealed
that the effect of increased cognitive load on antisaccade performance did not significantly dif-
fer amongst high and low anxious participants. No other significant effects emerged from this
analysis. The pattern of data that gave rise to these effects is presented in Fig 2.
Once more, though not related to the hypotheses at hand it was considered that some read-
ers may be interested in the influence of gender on antisaccade cost scores. As such, a post-hoc
analysis that also incorporated participant gender (male, female) as a between groups factor
was conducted. This analysis resulted in a significant interaction effect involving anxiety
group, cognitive load, and gender p = .043. However, once again we advise caution in the inter-
pretation of the results of this analysis as condition sample sizes were reduced considerably in
these analyses, and we guide readers to the publicly available dataset if they wish to pursue this
line of investigation further.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of participants’ mean saccade latency, in milliseconds, for each task condition and anxiety group.
Cognitive Load Stimulus Valence Saccade Type Low Anxiety Group
M (SD)
High Anxiety Group
M (SD)
Low Angry Prosaccade 174.25 (32.92) 166.00 (37.13)
Antisaccade 259.15 (28.57) 278.83 (47.63)
Neutral Prosaccade 168.72 (26.81) 160.10 (23.68)
Antisaccade 250.89 (33.86) 263.00 (43.59)
Happy Prosaccade 169.31 (25.38) 167.26 (31.88)
Antisaccade 246.28 (22.56) 274.46 (44.73)
High Angry Prosaccade 173.02 (32.73) 160.07 (28.73)
Antisaccade 244.35 (31.50) 256.92 (42.41)
Neutral Prosaccade 170.79 (33.32) 156.69 (27.72)
Antisaccade 245.34 (30.38) 260.20 (42.15)
Happy Prosaccade 175.35 (26.69) 160.63 (31.01)
Antisaccade 243.24 (36.45) 264.49 (38.97)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205720.t001
Fig 2. Saccade latencies, in milliseconds, for task conditions and anxiety groups. Height of bars represent mean
latencies, error bars represent 95% confidence interval, points represent mean latencies of individual participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205720.g002
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Saccade error rates
Lastly, analyses examined the potential influence of emotional tone, cognitive load, anxiety
vulnerability on the number of erroneous saccades performed by participants during the anti-
saccade task. The pattern of saccade error rates is presented in Fig 3. Across all conditions the
average saccade error rate was 7.98% (SD = 15.27). Once again, as the error rate represents a
binomial variable an analysis of variance was deemed inappropriate to examine differences
between experimental conditions. Instead, a mixed-effects logistic regression model was com-
puted. This model included participant saccade error rates as the outcome variable, and Anxi-
ety Group (high trait anxiety vs low trait anxiety), Saccade Type (prosaccade vs antisaccade),
Cognitive Load (low load vs high load), and Stimulus Valence (positive vs neutral vs negative)
as fixed-effect factors. Participants were included as a random-effect variable. The resulting
model was examined via an analysis of deviance that utilised Wald tests to examine the effect
of the fixed-effects on saccade error rates. Only a main effect of Saccade Type was evident χ2(5,
N = 43) = 200.07, p< .001. This effect was reflected by the observation that, in general, partici-
pants made a greater number of erroneous saccades on trials that required the execution of an
antisaccade (M = 15.48%, SD = 16.38) as compared to trials that required the execution of a
prosaccade (M = .48%, SD = .85). A main effect of Anxiety Group was not observed from the
analysis, χ2(3, N = 43) = 1.40, p = .70, nor any other significant main effects or interaction
effects. Thus, this analysis revealed that neither cognitive load condition or anxiety vulnerabil-
ity impacted upon the number of erroneous saccades made by participants.
Discussion
The present study examined the impact of increasing cognitive load on anxiety-linked differ-
ences in attentional control. As anticipated, the results revealed that high anxious participants
demonstrated significantly greater antisaccade costs, as compared to low anxious participants,
suggestive of poorer inhibitory attentional control. The study also found no effect of the emo-
tional tone of attentional stimuli on anxiety-linked differences in inhibitory attentional control
Fig 3. Saccade error rates, as a proportion of total trials, for task conditions and anxiety groups. Height of bars
represent mean error rates, error bars represent 95% confidence interval, points represent mean error rates of
individual participants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205720.g003
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performance. Interestingly, and in contrast to previous research the findings also suggest that
greater cognitive load may have facilitated attentional control performance. In general, partici-
pants were found to exhibit smaller antisaccade costs under conditions that imposed a higher
cognitive load, relative to the low load condition. Of primary importance however, was the
finding that the imposition of a higher cognitive load did not differentially impact inhibitory
attentional control performance in high anxious and low anxious participants. Furthermore,
the failure to observe such a difference could not be accounted for by anxiety-linked differ-
ences in engagement with cognitive load items or anxiety-linked differences in the number of
erroneous saccades performed during the antisaccade task. These findings will now be dis-
cussed in turn.
The present observation that high anxious participants demonstrated significantly greater
antisaccade costs as compared to low anxious participants is consistent with previous research
on anxiety-linked differences in cognitive performance. Specifically, the present findings are
consistent with earlier studies that have demonstrated association between elevated anxiety
and reduced attentional control performance [7,9], as well as the proposal by theorists that
individuals with heightened anxiety vulnerability, as compared to low in anxiety vulnerability,
are characterised by reduced control of attentional inhibition [2,23].
In contrast, the present study did not replicate previous findings that have revealed anxiety-
linked differences in attentional control performance to be modulated by the emotional tone
of attentional stimuli [7,31,32]. However, while some studies have demonstrated that the pre-
sentation of stimuli containing negative emotional tone may result in further reduction in
attentional control performance amongst high anxious individuals other studies have observed
no such effect [33]. Further, the present findings support the proposal that emotional stimuli
will become less salient to the attentional system when cognitive resources are taxed [35,36].
Researchers have also observed reduced processing of emotional information under condi-
tions of heightened cognitive load. For example, Van Dillen et al. [45] demonstrated that
increasing cognitive load resulted in down-regulation of neural responses associated with the
processing of negatively valenced stimuli. Similarly, King and Schaefer [46] demonstrated that
startle responses typically resulting from the viewing of negatively valenced images can be
reduced under high cognitive load, indicative of reduced saliency of the emotional content of
the images. Thus, it may be the case that in the present study the demands of the concurrent
cognitive load task diminished the attentional salience of the emotional tone of the attentional
stimuli.
Of primary importance however, the present findings differ from the hitherto inconsistent
findings on the effect of increasing cognitive load on anxiety-linked reduction in attentional
control performance. Berggren et al. [24,25] reported anxiety-linked impairments in atten-
tional control to be disproportionately elevated when high and low anxious participants were
subjected to a heightened cognitive load, relative to a low cognitive load. Conversely, Najmi
et al. [29] reported that heightened cognitive load disproportionately improved the attentional
control performance of participants with high anxiety vulnerability, as compared to low anxi-
ety vulnerability. However, despite demonstrating anxiety-linked impairment in inhibitory
attentional control performance, the present study demonstrated no effect of increasing cogni-
tive load on the relative inhibitory attentional control performance of high anxious partici-
pants, as compared to low anxious participants. It is of note that the present methodology
overcame limitations present in earlier studies. Specifically, the present study assessed individ-
ual differences in performance amongst individuals who differ in anxiety vulnerability rather
than state-anxiety, was able to demonstrate that engagement in the cognitive load task was
comparable between high and low anxious participants, and utilised an attentional task capa-
ble of specifically measuring individual differences in inhibitory attentional control amongst
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participants. Nonetheless, the inconsistency between the present findings and those of other
researchers highlights a clear need for further examination into the effect of cognitive load on
anxiety-linked differences in attentional control.
Importantly, the present findings also do not support predictions made by standing theories
that propose anxiety-linked impairment in inhibitory attentional control is underpinned by
anxiety-linked reductions in available cognitive capacity [15,23]. Specifically, these theories
have made the prediction that under conditions of high cognitive demand tasks will more
readily overload the cognitive capacity of high anxious individuals as compared to low anxious
individuals, and that this impact of cognitive demand will results in even greater impairment
in inhibitory attention control performance. It is possible however, the task used to impose a
high cognitive load in the present study did not engage cognitive resources to a sufficiently
high degree to overload the cognitive capacity of high anxious individuals. Thus, while high
anxious participants demonstrated some impairment on inhibitory attentional control they
were able to maintain attentional performance relative to low anxious participants when cog-
nitive load was increased. Alternately, it is possible that the task used to manipulate cognitive
load in the present task was indeed successful in doing so, though engaged a cognitive process
that does not consume the same resources as those recruited in the performance of inhibitory
attentional control.
Interestingly, the present finding that elevated cognitive load increased attentional control
performance in the present study may help to identify the mechanisms that underpin anxiety-
linked impairment in inhibitory attentional control. Other avenues of research investigating
the role of cognitive load on attentional control have demonstrated that the imposition of a
load that recruits processes to maintain visual representations of stimuli in working memory
can result in improved performance on attentional tasks by reducing the attentional resources
available to process distracting stimuli [16]. For example, across two studies Konstantinou
et al. [47,48] assessed participants’ processing of attentional distractors that were presented
during a response competition task. Participants concurrently adopted a cognitive load requir-
ing either visual maintenance or verbal rehearsal processes. It was found that increasing load
on visual maintenance led to greater inhibition of distractor stimuli, whereas increasing loads
on verbal rehearsal processes did not. Thus, it is plausible that the method of imposing cogni-
tive load in the present study predominantly consumed processes involved in visual mainte-
nance and so attenuated the salience of the attentional stimuli that were present in the
antisaccade task. Importantly, given that the present cognitive load manipulation failed to dif-
ferentially impact attentional control amongst high and low anxious participants, this may
indicate that anxiety-linked reduction in inhibitory attentional control performance is not
underpinned by anxiety-linked reductions in cognitive processes associated with visual main-
tenance. Nonetheless, while this may serve as a potential explanation for the present findings
there remains a clear need for researchers to continue to investigate the manner in which cog-
nitive load impacts attentional control performance in high anxious individuals, so as to reveal
the mechanisms that underpin anxiety-linked impairment in attentional control.
For the moment however, though the present study demonstrated evidence that heightened
anxiety vulnerability is characterised by a decline in inhibitory attentional control perfor-
mance, it did not demonstrate evidence that increasing cognitive load differentially impacted
performance for individual’s high in anxiety vulnerability, as compared to low in anxiety vul-
nerability. While these findings support the proposal made by theorists that heightened anxiety
vulnerability is characterised by reduced inhibitory attentional control, the findings sit con-
trary to the prediction that heightened cognitive load demands will disproportionately
adversely impact inhibitory attentional control performance amongst individuals with height-
ened anxiety vulnerability, as compared to those low in anxiety vulnerability.
Anxiety, attentional control, and cognitive load
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